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SYSTE:" SAFETY IN MIL TRANSPOR'l'NrION

by
QUlWE NORVELL SHITH

ABS'l'RACT

'This thesis ,

"System Safety in Rai l Transportntion," is

addressed to an individual having a basic technical background bu t
little or no experience in this field .

'fhe thesis niscusses the

need for and the benefits to be obtained by using system safety
techniques and principl es i n the railroad jndustry .
typica l railroad accidents are

rcvic\~'ed ,

Examples o f

and it is pointed out that

ana l ysis of the haz.ards in the railroad industry prior to lhe
accidents would ha v e identified problems which eventually resulte d

i n the accidents .

The system safety approach , which was develope d

for use in the aerospace and aviation fields , has proved to be
extreme l y effective and is now being adapted to many other areas .

The

surf,1;ce modes of transportation have the greatest need for these
techniques .

..

'fh e techniques covered i n this thesis i nclll ·le Hazar d

Analysis , Fau lt o r Logi c Tree Anal y sis , Failure
Ana l ysis , and Probabilistic Cost Analysis .
a hypothetica l mode l

,-10,](>5

and Effects

The lhesis also describes

for organizing and implc!OL!nting system safet y

approaches i n an exist i ng ra i lroad compan y .

~#o;4J{~'''cL-
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I.

OBJECTIVE AND PROCEDURE

Rail transportation safety is the end product of many inter-

related efforts.

Management decisions and operating policies must

reflect a new concern for safety.
new concepts and new skills .

Many occupations must integr ate

Those engaged in equipment design ,

safety training , establishing ma intenance standards and ope r ating
policies, using equipment , inspection and compl iance procedures,
establishing and enforcing standards and safety regulations , as we ll
as safety managers, government administrators and safety progr am
managers , must all be cognizant of a body of knowledge whi ch includes
appropriate safety considerations.
This thesis "System Safety in Rail Transportation ", was

initiated as a result of an effort by the U. S. Department of
Transportation and

t~e

Transportation Systems Institute of Florida

Technol ogical University to conduct a research project concerned with
the analysis of manpower requirements in transportation safety .

The

r esearch project is a follow on to recommendations made during a
workshop on transportat ion safety held in November , 19 72 .
The objective of this thesis is to develop a conceptual mode l
of a system safety program and organizati on structure fo r an existing railroad i nvolvi ng t he fol l owing e l ements :
1.

Review of the magnitude , t r ends, reporting
criteria , cost of acc i dents, and c ustomer

2

attitude in the railroad industry.
2.

Review of safety r e gulations.

3.

Review of the "state-of-the-art" in system

safety.
4.

Development of a hypothetical model for

system safety in rail transportation.
5.

Examples of system safety techniques applied

to the railroad industry.
As can be determined very little has been done along the lines
of applying the principles of sys tem safety to the operations of
railroads.

This thesis is not expected to solve the problem, but

to explore and consider such system safe ty programs and techniques
that would enhance the accide nt and fatality problem in the rail
industry.

It is recognized that these initial efforts only serve

to open the door.

It is realized that more comprehensive research

is needed.
In addition to discussing the need for system safety, this
thesis also looks at the benefits to be obtained by using system
safety techniques in the railroad industry.

It is pointed out that

analysis of the hazards in the railroad industry prior to the
accidents would have identified problems which eventually resulted
in the accidents.

The system safety

app~oach

encourages visualization of the

interrelationships of all the components of railroading and brings
accident possibilities into focus automatically in an orderly

,

3

manner. - Its effect is to broaden th e application of safety from a
piecemeal problem solving exercise to a safely designed opration .

4
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II.

A.

OVERVIE\; OF TIlE INDUSTRY

Magnitude
Although it is beset with many problems, the railroad

industry in the United States continues to play a significant role
in the movement of people and goods throughout this nation.

The

sixty eight Class I railroads and their nearly one third million
miles of track serve every major city in the country.
The United States has about 28 percent of the worlds' railroad mileage and handles about 24 percent of the freight that moves
on the railroad of the world.

The combined freight capacity of all

the railroad cars in the United States totals over 119 million tons.
The average freight train carries over 1,800 tons of freight in 70

cars.
Total railway mileage has decreased about 46,000 miles since
1920 , but railroads carry more than three-fourths again as much
freight today as in 1920.

Railroads in the United States represent an investment of
more than $37 billion.
fixed property.

About 52 percent of this investment is in

About 48 percent is in rolling stock.

Over 530

companies comprise the railroad system of the United States.
Freight accounts for about 90 cents of every dollar of income
earned by the U. S. railroads.
In

terms of overall progress, the American railroads are,
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for the most part, continuing to improve their position both
operationally and financially within the total spectrum of
transportation activities.

The Year 1972 appeared to be somewhat

of a pivotal year in this regard with operating revenues reaching
a record high of $13.4 billion.

Freight traffic volume and freight

revenues were on the upswing, but so were expenses.

The rate of

return on net investment was 2.95 percent.
On the merger front, the Illinois Central and Gulf Mobile
and Ohio finally joined forces by mid-year after a string of court
cases.
The industry's candidate for the longest-running labor
dispute, the Fireman-Manning case, was finally settled.

Also,

studies of the Railroad Retirement System paved the way for settlement by 1973.
Railroads made significant progress in getting attention for
legislative

propos~ls.

However, the Surface Transportation Act,

which looked like it would put railroads on an equal footing with
other carriers, disappeared with the 92nd Congress.
The transportation spotlight in 1972 was on the rail movement
of export grain.

Spurred by a 17.6 percent increase in grain

carloadings in the final six months of 1972, the nation's major
railroads achieved an all-time record in freight traffic for one
year - 7.78 billion ton/miles.

Heavy grain movements continued

into 1973 and, in the first four months, carloadings of grain were
up 37 percent over 1972.

All rail traffic, in fact, increased

6

8.5 percent in ton/miles as compared with the same period of 1972.
The increased demand for freight service was expected to continue
throughout 1973.
The speed of the trains vary from 10-15 miles per hour on
Class I track to 110 miles per hour on Class 6 track.

The average

speed for passenger trains is 41 miles per hour and 21 miles per
hour for freight trains.
B.

Trends
Throughout its history. the railroad industry has maintained

a reputation as a safe method of transportation .

In recent years

this reputation has been tarnished by many publicized accidents
involving the older systems.

However, with the exception of water

transportation, the fact clearly remains that passengers or freight
on board a train have not been subjected to the incidence of
fatality or freight loss associated with other modes of transportation.
As seen in Figure 1, railroad accidents have increased
steadily since 1964, from 5,317 to 10,419 in 1974.

However, railroad

fatalities have decreased from 880 in 1964 to 689 in 1974.
Preliminary statistics for calendar year 1974 show that train
accidents increased from 9,698 in 1973 to 10,419 in 1974.

However ,

the rate of increase in train accidents in 1974, was lower than in the
previous year.

The 1974 increase is estimated at 7.4 percent .

Statistics for the year 1974 indicate that injuries to railroad employees on duty were 15,641, compared to 13,098 for 1973.
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FatalitIes to railroad employees on duty declined from 158 1n 1973,
to 140 in 1974.

Casualties in grade crossing accidents dec lined

from 3,306 in 1973 to 3,275 in 1974.

For 1973, the rail industry

s uffe red 0.07 passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger miles

while passenger fatalities on buses were 0 . 24, domestic airlines
0.10, and automobiles and taxies were 1.70 (1) .

In terms of

empl oyee safety, the rail industry compares favorably with other
heavy industries.
c.

Reporting Criteria

Statistics in this report are based on a monetary reporting
threshold which involves train accidents of $750 or more damage to

equipment, track or roadbed, and personal injury.

The personal

injury includes accidents which incapacitates a person from
performing acceptable the duties assigned to him.
Effective January 1, 1975, the reporting criteria were
revised in order to correct the distortion that has occurred over
the years in the statistics relevant to reportable train accidents
due to inflation.

The criteria for r eportability in the personal

injury category have also been revised to be comparable with the
Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Act r equirements.
A new reporting threshold , which will be reflected in the 1975
reports, is for $1750 in damage s to railroad s on track equipment,
signals, track, track structures, and roadbe d.

This monetary

threshold will be adjusted every two years in increments of $100 to
reflect inflation pertinent to railroad train accidents.

The 1975

9

cri teria for reporting of personal injuries define "Reportable" as

being any event arising from the operation of a railroad which
results in medical treatment, restriction of work or motion, loss
of workdays, loss of consciousness, or any occupational illness of
a railroad employee as diagnosed by a physician (2).

D.

COst of Accidents

The major causes of accidents are human factors, equ ipment,
and track.

Associated with each accident is a damage cost.

The

average damage cost related to accidents, as a result of human
factors was $12,337, defects in equipment was $21,360, and defects
in way and structures was $16,225.

The total cost of damages for

the 10,419 accidents reported in 1974 was $175,354,810.

This

averages to $16,830 per accident.
For 1974, track defects caused 41 percent of accidents,
equipment defects caused 20 percent while human error caused 20
percent.
Existing track standards cover 98 percent of the reported
causes of all track accidents.

Therefore, it appears obvious that

the major effort in the track area must be to obtain better
compliance with these regulations.

This means better inspection

and compliance actions by the railroads themselves and the identification of trouble areas by Federal Railroad Administration and State
track inspectors.

Recently adopted equipment regulations cover 97

percent of the equipment defects causing train accidents.

Again, a

major effort must be made to obtain better compliance with equipment

10

standards (I).

E.

Customer Attitude

According to Nick Thimmesch, a Washington editor writing in
the Orlando Sentinel, the ride is getting bumpier and bumpier over

most of the nation's railway roadbeds and tracks (3).

Train

derailments have been increasing over the past few years even though
injuries and deaths are fewer from train accidents.
derailments are freights.

Nearly all

The resultant economic loss in the past

10 years is about $1 billion.

The potential damage is even greater

because freights haul increasingly l arge shipments of hazardous
materials, like propane and vinyl chloride.

Rail passenger fatalities per 100 million miles arc
substantially lower than airlines and buses, and far lower than
auto travel.

Still , derailment , the number one cause of train

accidents , presents a serious problem and broken rails are caused by
poor maintenance.

Poor maintenance results when railroads are broke ,

which many of them are.
The Interstate Commerce commission authorized a 10 percent
rate increase in June 1974 with the provision that railroads perform
postponed maintenance.

But better rail days are coming.

The bankrupt

railroads will soon get several hundred million dollars in guaranteed
loans and subsidies from the U. S. Government to improve track and
equipment.

The United States has the technology and the need for a

better railroad system .
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III.

REVIEW OF SAFETY REGULATIONS

For almost 50 years after their beginning, railroads in the
u.s. were subject to little governmental regulation.

Regulation at

first was largely at the state level, but public sentiment resulted
in the passage in 1887, of the Interstate Commerce Act, which placed

the railroads under federal regulation.

Later, other acts broadened

and extended the areas of federal regulation so that the railroads
finally had to clear through the Interstate Commerce Commission
almost all proposals for changes in such matters as financing,
equipment standards, signaling and rates.
With the establishment of the

u.s.

Department of Transportation

(DOT) on April I, 1967, administration of nine rail safety laws
previously administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
was transferred to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).

Thus,

the Federal Railroad Administration is now responsible for the
administration of the Safety Appliance Acts, the Ash Pan Act, the
Locomotive Inspection Act, the Accident Reports Act, the Signal
Inspection Act, the Hours of Service Act, and the Transportation of
Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles Act, all with respect to
railroad transportation (1).
The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, gave the Secretary
of Transportation authority to regulate all areas of railroad
safety.

The Secretary delegated this authority to the Federal

12

Railroaa Administration.

The task is complex, and FRAts initial

efforts were directed toward the adoption of track and equipment
standards.

Through a number of studies, FRA is now developing both

a short term action plan and a longer range plan to provide a basis
for directing the federal safety program.
In addition to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, the
FRA also has the legislative authority granted under the Rail Safety
Improvement Act of 1974.

These acts provide for an effective safety

program with a combination of research, regulations and enforcement .
There are now eight states participating in the rail safety
track program.

They are; Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon,

Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington.

These states are engaged in

the performance of investigation and surveillance activities.

A

state may participate in this program if the regulations and safety
practices applicable to railroad facilities, equipment, rolling
stock, and operations are regulated by a state agency.

This agency,

usually the State Department of Transportation or the State Public
Service Commission, must submit an annual certification.
State participation regulations require state track inspectors
to meet the same qualifications as their federal counterparts.
However, this program has been hampered in expanding participation
to a greater number of states chiefly because of the prescribed
inspector qualifications.

Few states already employ inspectors

with sufficient track experience, and, because of the lower level of
state salaries, some states have not been able to recruit qualified
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candidates.

According to the Railroad Safety Act of 1970, laws, rules,
regulations, orders and standards relating to railroad safety shall
be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.

A state may adopt

or continue in force any law or regulation until the Department of
Transportation has adopted a rule or law to cover the subject matter

of the state requirement.

A state may also adopt or continue in

force an additional or more stringent law or regulation when
necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard,
when not incompatible with any federal law, and when not creating an
undue burden on interstate conrnerce.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has the
authority to determine the cause or probable cause of conditions and
circumstances relating to accidents.

This authority may be delegated

to any office or official of the NTSB or to any office or official
of the Department of Transportation.
In a system that is dependent heavily upon fulfillment of
special procedures, it is essential that action be monitored to ensure
compliance with those procedures.

One prime prerequisite for

monitoring procedures or rules is to establish rules that distinguish
compliance or non-compliance before an accident occurs.

If a rule

is unforceable, it is of little value in controlling safety.

14
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IV.

STATE-OF-THE-ART IN SYSTEM SAFETY

In the beginning as with every new discipline the System
Safety pioneers struggled to develop an acceptable definition of
"their thing."

Years later, although many definitions have been

"coined" a standard simple, understandable definition eludes us.
One definition of "System Safety" is the optim\.lJl\ degree of
hazard elimination and/or control wi thin the constraints of

operational effectiveness, time and cost, attained through the
specific application of management, scientific and engineering
principles throughout all phases of a system life cycle (4) .
Ou=ing the 1960's several appraoches to System Safety
Programs were tried all of which proved to be inadequate.

There

was some effort to quantify safety requirements by specifying
accident probabilities and requiring a demonstration of these
probabilities by analysis.
Although system safety was developed primarily as a risk
management tool for complex aerospace systems, the logic and
techniques developed have many applications for non-aerospace
products and systems.

To achieve the goal of complete safety -- the

freedom of risks of injury or loss of equipment or property -- is
impractical.

It is practical however, to try to approach this

goal not only for moral reasons but also for cost effectiveness.
This definition of practical approach and assurance of acceptable
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risks is the primary business of system safety.

Briefly, this is

accomplished by translating prior safety experience, engineering
analyses, safety research and management actions into a stated
acceptable risk of injury or loss of material.
System Safety techniques, as developed and employed on weapon
systems and space projects can unquestionally be used advantageously
in the design and manufacture of any product and in any industry.
The trick is to select those system safety features which are
canpatible with the product line or indus try and apply them

effectively without compromising ability to compete in the market.
In other words the cost of the system safety application, and its
predicted impact on cost, performance, and service must be accurately
predicted if i t is to be successful.

At the same time, results

must be answered which provide reasonable measures to minimize the
risk of injury or damage to persons or property, giving full regard
to applicable industry standards, regulatory requirements, technological developments, and the standards of care required by society.
The advantages of the new technology "System Safety" have
been demonstrated in aerospace, aviation, and military activities.
Basic principles used in "System Safety" include the analysis of
system to identify hazards and the adoption of methods to eliminate
or control those hazards.

Many management and engineering methods

currently in use in the aerospace and aviation industries are being
adopted for use in other areas.

However, the procedures of analysis

under the concepts of "System Safety" have not as yet been adopted

16

in the $urface modes of transportation.
An accident cause is, in actuality , an extension of a hazard

to its potential.

The term "hazard" is preferred as i t is not

difficult to visualize man as an accident cause, but to categorize
man as a hazard places a different perspective on the interpretation.
It is easy to dismiss an accident as resulting from an employee's
negligence, when in fact, the accident may have resulted from the
failure of the system .
The railroad safety system, like all other systems, includes
four components:
(environment) (5).

(a) management, (b) man, (e) machine and (d) media
The Ven diagram in Figure 2 illustrates the

interface of these components for the safety of the railroad system.
It should be noted that the safety factors involving man's
performance in the system cannot stand alone, but must be interfaced
with management, machine, environment , or various combinations of
each or all.

A man-failure must involve a system failure in a safe

system.
It is impossible or uneconomical to eliminate all hazards in
the railroad system, but other choices are available.

If the hazard

presents a risk that cannot be assumed economically or sociologically,
the system must be made tolerant to the hazard.

This can be done

by three methods.
The installation of safety devices that do not require human
intervention to function i s the preferred method of making a system
tolerant to a hazard.

A second method of making a system tolerant
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to hazards involves the installation of warning devices.

~1ese

devices are less reliable than safety devices as they require human
intervention to respond to the warning given.

The third method of

making a system tolerant to hazards involves the establ i shment of

special procedures such as operating rules, bulleting , or special
instructions.

For the most part , the safety of the railroad system,

as we know it, is dependent largely upon this method.

As one would

expect , the preferred method of making a system tolerant to a
hazard also is generally the most expensive.

The initial cost of

the three methods generally varies directly with their effectiveness.

MANAGEMENT

MAN

(ENVIRONMENT)
MEDIA

Fig. 2.

Interrelationship of Safety Factors
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V.

A.

HYPOTHETICAL MODEL PROGRAM FOR SYSTEM SAFETY IN
RAIL TRANSPORTATION

Introduction

In order to clarify the safety activities in the rail
transportation industry, the following is set forth as a basic
program model to clearly establish its operational effectiveness
in the industry.

It consists essentially of an outline of the

relationships of management and employee responsibilities which
are necessary for this type of safety program.
It is felt that this model should become a basic part of
management policy and help govern its judgment on matters of

operation equally with considerations of types of service offered,
budget distribution, personnel relations, and other phases of
management policy.
This model program is administered, upon approval, by the

assistant vice-president of system safety.

His primary purpose is

to assist management in the recognition, elimination and/or control
of hazards particular to that industry.
Table 1 depicts the hypothesized System Safety and
Operations Department Operational Control Modules in each of the
eight sub-department groupings.

Functionally similar modules,

such. as security and property protection, are aligned horizontally
in the figure.

Operational Control modules consist of those routine
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activities carried out by the sub-department as shown vertically in

the figure.

A check in the column under the sub- department indicates

that the function that is aligned horizontally with it is performed
by someone in that particular sub-department (6) .

B.

Purpose
The first step to developing a System Safety program is to

determine needs of the industry, employee, and customer .
with , this can be rather vague.

To start

However, this is an iterative

process and further iterations will result in necessary specifics.
To state that the program will make the system safe gives little
idea of what it is to do.

To state that the program will reduce,

to an acceptable level, the possibility of accidental personnel o r
passenger injury, equipment, freight , or facility damage whiCh
could result in significant loss, gives a little better idea of why
the program is there and what the program goa l s a r e.
The management of rail transportation companies hold in high
regard the safety , welfare, and health of the public and their
employees .

The System Safety and Operations Department in this

hypothetical model was organized for the purpose of grouping under
the administration of a vice-president , the safety and operations
related functions previously being performed in the operating,
finance and law departments.

specifically the following functional

groups comprise the Systems Safety and Operations Department :
Security and Property Protection. Health Care and Insurance,
Freight Damage Prevention , Personal Injury Prevention, Transportation ,
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Engineering and Research, Locomotive and Track Maintenance, and
Signals and Train Controls.
The reason for organizing the safety related functions was
the need to develop a closer degree of coordination and cooperation
between related activities, directed toward the goals of

(~

reducing the human suffering and expense of personal injuries, and
{~

the expense and customer dissatisfaction related to freight

loss and damage.

Too often, the responsibility for achieving

these goals have been to widely distributed.

Not only should this

model be more effective, but also, labor savings should be realized.
In recognition of this and in the interest of modern management
practice, this model will constantly work toward the following
safety goals:
A.

Identify safety - critical systems, subsystems,
components events, and operations.

B.

Produce meaningful design, operation, and
training criteria to control identified hazards.

C.

Define acceptable risks and provide trade-off guidance.

D.

Verify that safety design criteria have been met
and/or provide guidance for trade-off decision.

E.

Examine the system and its life cycle to identify
possible hazards.

F.

Provide management with visibility of efforts to
control hazards.

These goals will be realized by performing the following ten
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pasic safety functions:
1.

Interpretation of needs

2.

Interpretation of laws

3.

Program Planning and Development

4.

Program Administration

5.

Safety analysis and design

6.

Inspection and Compliance

7.

Accident investigation

8.

Enforcement and security

9.

Safety training

10.

Other safety services.

These basic safety functions are shown in Figure 3.

C.

The Information Network For System Safety
The safety information network is only one of the several

kinds of networks found in railroad organizations; other systems
include money, personnel , work orders , and capital equipment networks.
The system safety specialist, in laying the groundwork for the
segmental development of a properly integrated system, must go

beyond a monolithic conception as shown in Figure 4.

He must

recognize that not all information processes are equally strongl y
tied together in the company.

This is a basis for initial s ub-

division of the universe of inrormation processing in the company
into conceptually manageable parts.
This problem is multidimensi onal.

If Figure 4 is reviewed ,

it can be shown that certain functions such as inspectio n, and
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compliance, accident investigation, safety training, etc., occur
in more than one network.

Therefore the view may be adopted, that

networks should be organized along the lines of similarity of
activity, regardless of the functional loci of parts of the
activities.
It has been postulated that two kinds of information systems

exist; major (one that affects the entire organization), and minor
(not of minor importance, but one that applies only to a limited

part of the organization) (7).

The major safety information systems

are inspection, hazardous materials, historical data, new technology,
accident, and injury, operational hazards reports, external
compliance directions, and catastrophic situations.
Planning is the most basic of all the safety functions
because it involves the selection of organizational and departmental
objectives and the determination of the means to achieve these
objectives.

Essentially, planning is the same whether applied to

an entire organization or to any hierarchical level in it.

Planning

generally involves five steps or processes as seen in Figure 5.
They are:
1.

Recognizing hazards or unsafe situations.

2.

Defining problems or unsafe situations and
developing alternate courses of action.

3.

Making a decision.

4.

Implementing the plan

S.

Checking control performance against the plan

..
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.Now

that the networks have been discussed, the conceptual

flow of information will be reviewed.
•

As

seen in Figure 6, no

matter what type of information is fed into the system, the flow
process is basically the same.

A piece of information is analyzed,

investigated, and some form of action is taken.

The results of

this process is then fed back into the system.
The information sources of the system safety department can
be classified into three broad types; (a) environmental, (b)
competitive, and (el internal (8).

The environmental information

ccnsists of;

(al

governmental policies

(b)

econcmic trends

(c)

technology

(d)

factors of operation

The competitive information includes such things as;
(a)

industry demand

(b)

firm demand

(e)

competition - past, present, and future

Often internal premises a£fect the planning and operating
decisions of the safety department more so than external information.
As they relate to the total system safety process they are;
(a)

policies

(b)

financial plans

(c)

investigations and inspections

•
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•

It was previously shown that the conceptual operations of

the system safety department could be defined in terms of the
elements and properties of information source (input),

analysis,

investigation, and action taken (output), and in a strict sense
this is so.
occur.

However, this system is dynamic and changes inevitably

Moreover, in this dynamic system it is necessary to review,

periodically or continuously, the state of the output in order to
make necessary alterations because of changes.
It is important to understand how the elements of the safety

department function as a system because, like any other system,
the department operates through the medium of information.
The conceptual system flow chart as seen in Figure 6 is a

common method of indicating the general structural of an information
system.

This system flow as illustrated by the flow chart, is

quite general in nature and indicates only the main components of
the system.

At this

sta~e ,

the chart does not indicate what pro-

cessing occurs at particular steps in the flow or what spec ific
data, equipment , or personnel are involved.

However, the chart is

extremely important because it provides the foundation and framework
upon which detailed specifications will follow.
D.

Organization For Syst.em Safety
The system safety concept is the elimination of hazards in

the system.

This is the most economical way to r educe accidents

which result in lo ss of life and property.

System safety not only
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identifies hazards, but also shows the likelihood of their activation
and points out the alternative methods available to eliminate them.
With this visibility into the problem area, management can then
decide which hazards to eliminate , which hazards to control, and
which risk to assume.
The activities of hazard recognition and e limination or
control encompass the sum total of Accident Prevention.

If these

activities were perfectly achievable all else could be disregarded
and supplemental activities would not be

n~cessary.

Since they are

not perfectly achievable, the goal must be to first accomplish them
in the best way possible and then apply supplemental management

and technical resources to enhance the desired level of safety.
These activities are the responsibility of every director
as shown in Figure 7.

The general hazards associated with rail

transit are readily determined from inspections, investigations,
and the Federal Accident Statistics .

This organizational structure

permits flexible and efficient response to the rail industry's
safety and operation needs.

This structure affordS the department

the mobility and exposure necessary to carry out its programs.
To carry out the responsibilities assigned the System Safety
and Operations Department as seen in Figure 7, the department is
composed of staff and field personnel.

The staff personnel provide

the general direction to all accident prevention programs as well
as to the administrative matters of the department.

Field

personnel carry out safety programs in the field as well as preparing
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reports of investigative activities.

E.

Responsibility

The system safety organization shal l be responsible for
managing and performing the overall system safety program.

The

responsibilities and functions of those directly associated with
system safety pOlicies and implementation of the program shall be
clearly defined in this section .
Ideally, it should be possible for any given mode of
transportation to describe a unique system safety organization
which would be optimal for carrying out a safety program suitable
for that particular mode of transportation.

From a practical

point of view, it is obvious that no such single organizational
entity can be described.

However, it can be stated, that all of

the task in the domain of safety which need to be performed so
that a system may be operated safely can always be specified .

It

can further be stated that there are usually a vari ety of ways to
organize so that these tasks will be performed satisfactori ly.
job descriptions that follOW are only one way to accomplish the
task s necessary to operate a railroad safely .

The

JJ
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Job Title

Vice President
Scope

The Vice-President of the system safety and operations
department has the responsibility to develop an effective
program of accident prevention.
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Job Title
Assistant to Vice President
Scope
The Assistant to Vice President serves as an administrative
assistant to the Vice President.

He makes

recornm~,dations

concerning policy in administrative, personnel, and other
matters pertaining to the eight sub-departments in the
System Safety and Cperations Department and is directly
responsible to see that all administrative policies and
directions are carried out by these groups to ach i eve
the mission of reducing safety losses.
Duties
1.

Responsible for the effective administration of all

offices in the department , which includes all record
keeping, reports , payroll, requisitions for and repairs
to office equipment , assignment of leased vehicles and
personnel.
2.

Supervision of office clerical force , bulletining

and assigning contract-covered positions.
3.

Serves as departmental personnel officer, and

supervises the preparation and maintenance of
personnel records, preparation of authority for
payroll changes and submits them to the sub-department
heads for approval.

Makes recommendations regarding

promotions and merit increases.
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4,

Prepares the staff departmental budget and

coordinates the preparation of budgets by the subdepartments.

He also constantly keeps a close check

on expenditures and brings to the attention of the
sub-department heads those areas in which expenses
are unnecessary or out of line.
5.

Administers lahor agreements, investigates and replies

to claims and grievances and prepares recommendations
for handling by labor relations.
6.

Prepares directives pertaining to activities of

the various sub-departments and replies to correspondence

received by the department head.
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Job Title
Assistant Vice President for System Safety
Scope

Assistant Vice President for System Safety under the
overall direction of the Vice President, exercises
general supervision over the four

s~departments

comprising the system safety group.

Establishes yearly

objectives for each of the sub-departments as well as
periodic goals for progress which must be achieved
during the year.

Honitors progress, and initiates

corrective action when indicated, to assure that all
departmental and sub-departmental goals are met on
schedule.

Makes policy recommendations to the

Vice President, also has direct responsibility for
implementation of all departmental programs and policies.
Duties

1.

Under the overall direction of the Vice President,

supervises the activities through department directors,
of the four sub-departments comprising the system safety
group.

2.

Responsible for continuous appraisal of functions

performed by each group and of devising methods of
eliminating non-productive functions or, in the
alternative, of improving their effectiveness to
insure that all goals are met on schedule.
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3.

Periodically reviews organizational structure of

each sub-department to be certain that it is properly
designed to perform the responsibilities assigned to it.
4.

In consultation with sub-department directors,

evaluates personnel to ascertain their effectiveness
in the positions to which they are assigned, and to
determine which individuals are capable of taking on
increased responsibilities as well as those whose
r esponsibilities should be reduced.
5.

Consults with personnel of other railroads, and

industrial concerns to find better methods of reducing
or eliminating safety losses.
6.

Works closely with other departments to assist in

designing and implementing methods and equipment to
enable them to carry out their responsibilities
insofar as the activities of those departments affect
safety losses.

•
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Job Title
Specialist in System Safety
Scope
Specialist in System Safety , reports directly to the
Assistant Vice President of

Sy~tem

Safety.

He is

re sponsible for the development and maintenance of
formalized procedures for the analysis of system safety
that force a logical examination of all elements of the
railroad system and identify all possible sources of
accidents.
Duties
1.

Identification and classification of all hazards

2.

Application of system safety techniques to

railroading operations
3.

Aid to Assistant Vice President in the development

of total system safety program.
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Job Title
Director of Security and Property Protection
Scope

Director of Security and Property Protection, exercise
general supervision over the Security and Property

Protection sub-department.

Has direct and immediate

responsibility for instituting and implementing programs
to prevent theft and damage caused by vandalism and
other reasons to property owned by the company and
that which is entrusted to its care.

Functions as

liaison in area of his responsibility with other railroad
police departments , federal , state and other agencies.
Directs activities concerning the accumulation of
data needed to pin point problem areas.
Duties
1.

Under the overall direction of the Assistant

Vice President of System Safety , administers the
affairs of the Security and Property Protection
sub-department .
2.

Has direct responsibility for the selection,

training and overall efficiency of personnel in
his group.
3.

Develops and implements programs designed to

combat thefts , vandalism, trespassing, and other
problems.
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4.

Keeps abreast of industry practices in the area of

his responsibility to improve the security and property
protection function.
S.

Monitors effectiveness of practice engaged in by

personnel in his department and make changes where
indicated.
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Job Title
Director of Health care and Insurance
Scope
Director of Health care and Insurance, responsible
for developing and implementing health care and
insurance programs, that are comparable with the
benefits common to the industry.

,
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Job Title
Director of Freight Damage Prevention
Scope

Director of Freight Damage Prevention, exercises
general supervision over the freight damage
prevention group under the overall direction of
the Assistant Vice President of System Safety.
Has direct and

~ediate

responsibility for the

administration of the group, and for the
development and implementation of programs
designed to eliminate damage to lading in transit.
Duties
1.

Administers the affairs of the Freight Damage

Prevention sub-department in

tt~

areas of

responsibility assigned to it .
2.

Has direct responsibility for the selection,

training and overall efficiency of pers onnel assigned
to the group .

3.

Responsible for the establishment of procedures

designed to enable the group to effectively carry
out its responsibilities.
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Job Title
Director of Personal Injury Prevention
Scope

Director of Personal Injury Prevention, exercises
general supervision over the Personal

Inju~~

Prevention sub-department under the overall direction
of the Vice President of system safety.

Has direct

and immediate r esponsibility for instituting and
implementing programs to prevent accidents and
otherwise reduce personal and fatal injuries and
property damage.

Has responsibility for inspection

of buildings and facilities to identify and eliminate
hazards.

Is responsible for compliance with all

federal and state statutes dealing with safety .
Directs activities concerning the accummul ation of
data needed in connection with the Federal Railroad
Safety Act .
Duties
1.

under the overall direction of

the

Assistant

Vice President of System Safety , he administers the
affairs of the Personal Injury Prevention sub-department in the areas of responsibility assigned to it.
2.

Has direct responsibility for the selection ,

t r aining and overall efficiency of personne l in the
department.

44

3.

Must develop programs to promote safety and prevent

accidents and implement these programs to see that they
are carried out efficiently and effectively.
4.

Has the responsibility of directing activities to

secure and analyze pertinent data concerning causes and
effects of accidents.
5.

On the basis of data accummulated, must monitor the

effectiveness of the programs he institutes and make
such changes as seen indicated.

Changing old programs

and initiating new ones is a continuous process.
6.

Must devise plans to meet any emergency situation

arising out of a derailment or other accident involving
volatile or explosive material and must be certain that
those persons responsible for carrying out the disaster
plan are adequately trained to meet the situation.
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Job Title
Manager of Compliance and Administration
Scope

Manager of Compliance and Administration , serves in a
staff capacity under the overall direction of the
Director of Personal Injury Prevention , and assists
the Director in administering and coordinating the
staff and field positions of the Personal Injury
Prevention sub- department.

Serves as reporting

officer to the Department of Transportation and

various state commissions in safety , accident re l ated
matters .

Acts as compliance officer for requirements

of federal, state and local regulatory agencies.
Duties
1.

Manages the efficient and economical operation of

the office of the Director , and assists in the
preparation of annual budget and monthly budget
variance reports.
2.

Supervises the preparation and distribution of

all reports, including personal injuries bo employees ,
passengers, tresspassers and others, crossing accidents ,
etc., to federal and state agencies .

Initiates reports

to proper parties of all incidents involving huzardous
materials to ensure that shipper and carrier errors
are conne cted.
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3.

Maintains central library for safety regulations ,

reference materials and literature pertaining to
heal th and safety .

4.

Maintains contact and close working relationships

with such agencies as the Bureau of Explosives,
Department of Transportation, Hazardous Materials
Board and others.
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Job Titie
Manager of Planning and Training
Scope

Manager of Planning and Training, serves in a staff
capacity under the overall direction of the Director,
and assists the director in coordinating the staff
and field functions of the Personal Injury Prevention
sub-department.

Responsible for developing and

implementing programs and training procedures for
Personal Injury Prevention act ivities.

Reviews

adequacy of safety programs initiated by the
department.

Responsible for developing management

information systems and fer analytical reviews of
program effectiveness.
Duties
1.

Has direct responsibility for developing effective

programs and training procedures for Personal Injury
Prevention sub-department activities , including
operations, visual aids, posters, contests, gimmicks,
etc.
2.

Analyzes results obtained from the departments

safety programs and recommends policies to ensure that
programs and procedures are effective and consistent
with the objectives of the Operating

sub-depar~ent

as well as the System Safety sub-department .
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3.

Conducts training sessions for departmental per sonnel ,

and makes spontaneous and prepared speeches at safety
and staff meetings and civic or other gatherings.
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Job Title

Manager of Safety
Scope

Manager of Safety serves in a staff capacity under
the overall direction of the director.

He has the

responsibility for planning, establishing a.nd
directing safety, fire prevention, hazardous matez:ials

handling and environmental controls programs.
activi~ie5

The

of this group must be accomplished through

effective implementation of a safety program.
Duties
1.

Assists in coordinating the activities of staff

and field personnel in the areas of responsibility
assigned to the group.
2.

Isolates problem areas, develops answers to

problems and advises director in safety activities
and special safety matters.
3.

Recommends standards for personal protective

equipment, in consultation with the Operations , subdepartment officers and outside experts .
4.

Recommends adoption or revision of safety rules

and instructions to further personal injury prevention
objectivs.
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Job Title

Motive Power and Equipnent Inspector
Scope

Motive Power and Equipment Inspector, under the
direct supervision of the M3nager of safety.

Is

responsible for the improvement and advancement of
railroad safety in areas related to the design ,
construction, inspection, maintenance and use of
railroad rolling stock including motive power
equipment, and related appurtenances.

Duties
1.

Inspects and tests railroad rolling stock , motive

power equipment and related appurtenances.

2.

Investigates serious railroad accidents and

complaints alleging non-compliance with laws and
safety standards.
3.

Prepares and distributes reports regarding

accidents, potential hazards , and non-compliance "lith

safety laws and safety standards.
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Job Title

Signals and Train Control Inspector
Scope

Signals and Train Control Inspector , under the direct

supervision of the Manager of Safety_

He must

implement the department safety policies related

to signal and train control systems, insure
compliance with laws ,

regulatio~s ,

standards and

rules relative to the design construction,
maintenance , inspection and USc of signal and

train control systems .
Duties

1.

Assist in the review of specifications and plans

of the department for rebuilding existing signal or
traffic contro l systems.

2.

Investigates serious railroad accidents and

complaints alleging non-compliance with the laws and
safety standards.
3.

Inspects and test signal and train control systems,

and campanen ts.

4.

Prepares and distributes reports regarding accidents

and non-compliance with safety laws and safety standards .
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Job Title
Operating Practices- Hazardous Material Inspector
Scope

Operating Practices- Hazardous Material Inspector,
serves under the Manager of Safety and is responsible
for investigating accidents , issuing operating practices ,
occupational safety conditions, transportation of
hazardous material.
Duties
1.

Investigates serious accidents and complaints

alleging non-compliance with the laws and safety

standards.
2.

Reviews records to determine whether employees

connected with the movement of trains are permitted
to be or remain on duty contrary to the provisions of
the law.

3.

Maintains complete reference library on hazardous

materials.

4.

Prepares and distributes reports regarding accidents

and non-compliance with safety laws and safety standards.
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Job Title

Track Inspector
Scope

Track Inspectors serve under the Manager of Safety and
is responsible for the improvement and advancement of
ra i lroad safety in areas related to the design,
construction , inspection , maintenance , and use of

railroad tracks and their related appurtenances.
Duties
1.

Makes personal inspections to determine the

condition of the roadbed, track struction , track
geometry, and track related devices .
2.

Investigates serious railroad accident and

complaints alleging non-compliance with the laws

and safety standards_
3.

Prepares and distributes reports regarding

accidents and non-compliance with safety laws and
safety standards.
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Job Title
Safety Agent
Scope

Safety Agent, serves under the Manager of Planning
and Training, is responsible for having a good
working knowledge of the safety and operating rules
of the company.

Duties
1.

carry out field inspections aimed at detecting

and reporting unsafe work practices, rule violations,
conditions and techniques or lack of them posing
potential causes for accidents.
2.

Personally investigate all lost time injuries

3.

Assist in training sessions and seminars for

system Safety and other deparbnental personneL
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Job Title
Analyst
Scope

Analyst, serves under the Manager of Compliance
and Administration.

He assists in the development,

implementation and review of the management information
systems used in the System Safety sub-department .
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The hypothetical system safety model shall provide a
disciplined approach to methodically control safety aspects and
evaluate the companies safety activities, identify hazards and
prescribe corrective action in a timely cost effective manner.
The model will:

a)

Evaluate technical approaches to systems safety

b)

Identify possible safety interface problems

c)

Highlight special areas of safety consideration

d)

Define areas requiring further safety investigation

Of course, in addition to the previous basic policy and

list of responsibilities there should be descriptions of how
safety committees should operate and descriptions of the

inspection system to be used.
In conclusion, the first step in system safety is not a
technical one .
that follows.

It is concerned with gaining support for the work
The system safety personnel must have the support

of most members of the organization in order to obtain information
and to obtain acceptance of the final system.

At a minimum,

members of the organization should be informed of the objectives
and nature of the department.

•

VI.

EXAMPLES OF SYSTEM SAFETY TECHNIQUES

APPLIED TO RAILROADS
System analysis need not be a highly complicated task .
important point is ,

give~

The

the system description, a decision must be

made as to the purpose of the analysis.

Once this decision has been

reached, the analytical technique that will produce the needed data
is sel ected and applied.
On initial examination , there appea2' to be many analytical

tecllniques available for the purpose of identifying hazards and
evaluating risks.

However, a detailed review of these methods will

r eveal that most of them are modifications of other t echniques , and
that the modification was made either to accommodate a unique system ,
or to develop a unique set of data.
There are essentially three basic ana l ytical methods:
1.

Hazard ana l ysis

2.

Logic tree or fau l t analysis

3.

Failure mode and effects analysis

In the sections that follow, these three methods will be
discussed and explained with the use of examples .

In addition to

the three analytical methods mentioned above , the probabilistic
behavior of accident systerrs will be considered .
The examples given in the sections that follow are on l y for
the purpose of illustrating the application of the foregoing
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principles and procedures to typical situations which might be
encountered in the rail transportation industry.

While they follow

good industry practice, they are only illustrations, and must not
be r egarded as a complete engineering analysis of a specific problem.

The numerical values shown for the probability of occurrence
of certain events are assumed for illustrative purposes only and
have no basis in actual operating experience.

A.

Hazard Analysis

Although there are many definitions of a hazard, for the
purposes of this paper, a hazard will be defined as any conditions
which has potential to cause an accident.

An accident in turn can

be defined as a change of operations mode, design or hwnan interface
which leads to an unwanted transfer of energy due to lack of
barriers or controls which in turn produces injury to persons,
property or process.

This focuses attention on change , people,

energy sources and barriers or controls.

Changes can occur in the

nature of the work (such as from operation to maintenance), in the
environment (from new operating conditions or violent weather
conditions) in the machinery (from age, upgrading, or replacement),
in the people (from new or transferred persons), in management
systems (from reorganization) in procedures (due to design
modifications) and in numerous other areas.

Accident histories

have shown that changing situations are prone to lead to equipment
troubles or human error which in turn are likely to trigger accidents.

The hazard analysis addresses the total system from the
standpoint of energy sources which can get out of control.

The

basic logic in conducting this analysis is shown in Figure B.
Initially, the hazards in a particular system are ide ntified
by analyzing engineering and accident information.

A human error

checklist which is derived from accident/incident experience and
human engineering data sources can also be helpful.

The

operational task is then broken down in a step-by-step procedure,
and each step is considered for possibility of human error and
probability of a basic hazard leading to an accident.

Recommendations

are made to eliminate, or control the hazards, to install saiety
devices, manning devices or to establish special procedures.
Once we have defined the basic hazards and human errors which
should be applied in the analysis operation, we con3ider each of
them for each operational phase.
System safety, not only identifies hazards, but also shows
the likelihood of their activation and points out the alternative
methods available to eliminate them.

A potential hazard assessment

is usually made using such historical safety " data as accident/
incident analyses and safety design, operations and human error
checklists.

Also, an analysis is made of the plans, concepts and

proposed operating modes for the system.

These two efforts result

in the production of a Preliminary Hazard Analysis.

The Preliminary

Hazard Analysis list all known hazards with classification as safe,
marginal, critical, or catastrophic (9) .

Hazard
I eentification
Cilecl:: List

Eliminate Hazards

Control Hazards
Operations
Task Descriptions
Procedure

.c

Safety Devices

)

Identify Hazards
Vlarning Devi ces

Human

Special Proce eures

Error
Cleek List

Fig. 8.

Basic Logic in Hazard Analysis

'"o

61

Classification of Hazards
Class I.

Safe:

Conditions such that human error,
deficiency or inadequacy of design ,
or equipment malfunction will not
result in personnel injury o r equipment
damage.

Class II.

Marginal:

Conditions such that human error,
deficiency or inadequacy of design,
or equipment malfunction will degrade
system performance or damage equipment,
but counteraction or control can be
undertaken

SUdl

that serious injury

to personnel or significant damage
will not occur.
Class III.

Critical :

Conditions such that human error,
deficiency or inadequacy of design, or
equipment malfunction will cause
personnel injury , serious equipment
damage, or will result in a hazard
requiring immediate corrective action
for personnel or system survival .
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Class rJ.

catastrophic:

Conditions such that hlRnan error,

deficiency or inadequacy of design ,
or equipment malfunction will
severely degrade system performance
and cause subsequent system loss or
cause death or serious , irreversible
inj uries to personnel .

TABLE 2
HAZARD CLASSIFICATION

CI.ASS

gAZARD

EQUIFMENT DAMAGE

PERSONNEL

I

SAFE

NONE

NONE

II

MARGINAL

MINOR

NONE

III

CRITICAL

SUBSTANTIAL

IV

CATASTROPHIC

SYSTEH LOSS

*TRANSIENT

**

INJURY

INJURY

IRREVERSIBLE

INJURY OR DEATH

*
**

Transient Injury - is one from which recove ry is effected
with no resultant loss of functional capability or
shortening of life span .
Irreversible Injury (residual) - one which is not transient.
As may be seen in Figure 9 , the hazard to be evaluated is

first checked as to its severity .

The hazards are then ranked in

the "totem pole" fashion to establish priorities for judgments and
actions necessary to eliminating or controlling the hazard.

TO

aid in this ranking, a hazard reduction precedence is used.

The
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first order of priority, of course, is to eliminate the hazards
and the second order to provide safety devices which control the
hazards.

The third priority is to install warning devices to

indicate lack of control and the fourth provides for special
control procedures to prevent or amelioriate potential damage.
As

development of the system proceeds, the Preliminary

Hazard Analysis, by an iterative process, becomes a hazard cata log.
This catalog provides a tracking system for each hazard which could
have catastrophic or critical consequences.

Those hazards which

cannot be eliminated or controlled are identified as potential
acceptable risks and the logic for these decisions is recorded for

each hazard item.

The hazard catalog then becomes a risk control

document which is constantly reviewed by project management to
determine trade-offs in design and operations alternatives.
In Table 3 the general hazards and some of the sub-hazards
common to the rail industry, are classified according to the
categorization criteria just described.
It has been inferred up to this point that the categorization
criteria was carefully selected and documented before hazards are
evaluated.

In reality the criteria evolved with hazard evaluation

efforts as the need for setting priorities was encountered.

A

similar evolution occurred before the Hazard Evaluation Logic
depicted in Figure 9 was specifically documented.

This logic

provides the well known "hazards precedence sequence" conmon to
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TABLE 3
GENERAL HAZARDS

COmmon to the Rai lroad Indus try (10)
CLASSIFICATION
HAZARD

Personal Injury Incident
Burns/Smoke Inhalation
Tripping/Falling
Electrical Shock

I

II

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Collision (includes Excessive Stopping Dist.)

X
X
X
X

Wi t il othel: train (s)

Vehicle at Cros~in9
Person or Vehicle on Track
Derailment

In Yard (low speed)
Revenue Service (moderate speed)
Revenue Service (high speed)
Door Opening Underway

Inadvertent Uncoupling
In Yard (low speed)
Revenue Service (moderate speed)
Revenue Service (high speed)

IV

x

\'lindow Breaking

Fire/SmoKe
Under car
Car Roof
Car Interior
Any of above with unattended car
In tunne l or on elevation

III

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
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System Safety efforts .

While this portrayal does not add any

unique features to the evaluation process , it docs provide an
ordered reference sequence which assures that each hazard is
evaluated consistently and with the same order of considerati on .
The hazard evaluation process in Figure 9 is the heart
of the System Safety Program under consideration .

For this

r eason a specific example will now be considered on the following
page.
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The case to be considered involves excessive stopping distance
which can clearly be a cause factor in a collision, a hazard of
potential catastrophic severity (10).

This case involves an

apparent failure of a master controller tip-up handle which typically
provides the deadman feature on propulsion control equipment.

The

design concept of the handle requires the operator to hold it in a
depressed condition or experience an automatic emergency brake
application.

With this concept the train is automatically stopped

if the operator becomes unconscious or leaves his station .

In the

cases reported the handle failed to pop up and activate the brake
application when released.

One of the most likely causes was found

to be a ndssing spring in the mechanism.

HO<;'Iever, other possible

causes such as the assembly technique, quality control in manufacture ,
and lubrication method were also judged possible.

In evaluating

and controlling this hazard relative to the logic of Figure 9, it
has already been noted that the results of excessive stopping
distance could be catastrophic.

However, a further consideration was

that both the handle and the operator would have to fail
simultaneously for potential collision conditions to be present.
On this basis, it must be questioned whether the combined protection
of the tip-up handle and operating procedures were not sufficient
to consider the hazard controllable.

The final conclusion arrived

at is that protection is adequate but that any simple design
improvements should be cut in which could prevent binding, and
special quality control attention should be given.

In reality . an
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. improved screw staking procedures was incorporated in the assembly
procedure and quality control checks were revised.

Additionally, a

roll pin was added to the handle design to help prevent an
operator from purposely causing its removal with a pencil or other
sharp instrument , and thereby defeating the deadman.
B.

Logic Tree or Fault Tree Analysis

The Fault Tree Analysis begins by identifying an Undesired
Event whose causes are to be traced.

Graphically, this event is

placed at the top of the page and represents the base of a tree
whose branch will be developed and will extend downlf/ard.

Once the

undesired event , also called a Top Event, is specified, it is
necessary to identify the immediate causes which directly could
cause this top event.

Each of these causative events, in turn, can

be furth e r broken down into subordinate events .

This process is

continued until one arrives at basic input events that cannot be
broken do\'iT\ further, or for which probability data are available
so there is no need to go further .

This process creates a

diagr~~

which resemb les a tree whose branches extend and spread out downward , with each branch terminating in basic input events.
Figure 10 illustrates the diagrammatic arrangement of a
fault tree, and Figure 11 identifies and defines the geometric
s~nbo1is

that are commonly used in fault tree construction (II).

It is to be noted that a fa1l1t tree consists of three essential
elements

input events, logic gates, and output events.

The

•

Undesired
Event
AND Logic iGate

Event

Restriction
Event
Undeveloped
Event
Priority

Event
Transfer

In

Transfer
Out

Normal
Event
Basic
Event

'"'"

Basic
Event
1"ig. 10.

Sample Fault Tree
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(

)

Attached to logic gate to specify condition

An event caused by one or more other events
which are identified

o

A basic input event that does not require
further development as to causes

event which is not developed further as
to its causes because of lack of information
or significance
An

An event ",·hich is normal for the system;

not a fault or failure per se

o

AND gate - output event occurs onl y if all
the inp ut events are present
OR gate - output event occurs when one or
more of the input events are present
COntinuation symbol to i dentica l portion
of faul t tree

~

transfer IN
transfer OUT

Fig. 11.

Symbols Used in Fault Tree Construction
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basic logic gates are of two kinds, namely OR gates and AND gates.
If an output event can be caused by one or more input events, either
when each acts by itself, or when they act together, these input
events pass through an OR gate.

On the other hand, if an output

event can be caused only when all input events must act in combination, these input events pass through an AND gate.
This concept is illustrated in Figure 12 where the top event
is defined as a derailment.

oerailm~nt

is a hazardous condition

which has long been a major concern in the railroad industry.

As

shown in Figure 12, it can result from a variety of contributing
factors and conditions such as track or car defects, or any
oombanat~on

of these coupl ed with unproper cperation.

A typical

example would be excessive speed followed by a wheel slide due to
locked wheels, and subsequent derailment while transitioning a
worn switch point.

Identification of the possible causes is .:

relatively easy for the hazard of derailment.

The elimination or

correction of these causes can be very diffcult.
After the fault tree is completely structured and all
branches terminate in basic input events (circles or diamonds) ,
the next step in the analysis is to calculate the probability of
occurrence of the top event.

The numerical evaluation of a fault

tree involves calculating the probability of occurrence of an
output event from the known or previously computed probabilities
of all input events to the given logic gate.

These computations

are repeated until the probability of occurrence of the top event

DERAILMENT

CAR DEFEO

X
17
"16

"15

SUSPENSION
DEFECT

TRUCK
DEF~

COUPLER
I

"12

AXLE
FAILURE

STRUCTURE

DEFEO

J
X8

LJ~

"14

I CATASTROPHIC

DeFECT

"9

~vHEEL

BREAKS

X
13

r...l

'-IQTOR MOUNT

X
10

F

Xu

FLAT WHEEL

Ix

X6

5

...

WHEEL

"1

Fi g . 12.

'"

DO"

SLIP/SLD
FL ' O

"2

Fault Tree Analysis of Events or Conditions Leading to a Train Derailment (1 0 )
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is determined.

Therefore it is necessary to know how the probabilities

of the inputs are related to that of the output through the basic
logic gates, namely an AND gate or an OR gate.
To evaluate a fault tree manually, it is necessary to perform
the following operations (11).
1.

Convert the combinationational properties of all
the logic elements into Boolean algebraic expressions.

2.

Eliminate all redundancies.

3.

Evaluate algebraic expressions as probabilities using
numerical data for basic input events.

The conversion of the logic diagram into algebraic form must
proceed from the bottom up, with every AND gate representing arrd
intersection of the inputs, and every OR gate representing a union
of the inputs.

The actual algebraic manipulations follow accustomed

practice of conventional algebra with an AND gate being analogous
to a product and an OR gate being analogous to a sum.

The same

results would be obtained if one were to use the notation of set
theory algebra, namely "u" for a union, or "n" for an intersection.
Boolean algebra (also known as propositional or symbolic
algebra) deals only with two states -- yes or no, on or off, success
or failure, 1 or 0 -- and is therefore useful for handling the logic
gates of a fault tree which may be considered as either open or
closed.

Since there is almost a one-to-one correspondence between

the rules of Boolean algebra and those of set theory, the latter
may be used to explain the concepts involved.
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In Boolean algebra notation we will be concerned only with
two operator symbols.

The symbol " .. " is used to indicate an

intersection of two sets which applies to an AND gate.

The symbol

"+" is used to indicate the union of two sets which applies to an
OR gate.

These symbols signify only the above operations and do

not have the same meaning as the plus sign or product sign of
common arithmetic.

However, to the extent that some of the basic

laws of common algebra also are valid in Boolean algebra, certain
manipulations can be carried out in the accustomed manner.

The

following laws are valid in Boolean algebra as well as in common
algebra (ll).

Commulative Laws

A·B = B*A
A+B = B+A

(2)

A*(B*C) = (A*B)*C

Associative Laws

A+(B+C) = (A+B)+C
A*(B+C)

=

(1)

A*B + A*C

( 3)

(4)

Distributive Laws

(5)

In addition to the above, the following laws app ly to
Boolean algebra and to set theory, but not to common algebra.
A+A = A

(6)

=A

(7)

A+ (A*B) = A

(8)

A* (MB) = A

(9)

A*A

A+B*C

=

(A+B) * (A+C)

(10)
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The task of evaluating a fault tree by hand is tedious
because the algebraic expressions for intermediate events

becom~

progressively longer as one proceeds up the tree to the top event.
The procedure for the manual quantitative evaluation of a
fault tree is illustrated below .

The example of Figure 12, derail-

ment, is defined as the undesired event .

Numerical value s for the

basic input events were arbitrarily assumed to permit carrying the
sample calculations to numerical results.
The followinb Boolean algebraic equations represent the
symbolic logic diagram of Figure 12.

The sequence shown is from

the bottan of the tree upward.

-

X6
X
10

X +X +X +X
1 2 3 4

(il)

XS+X6+ X7

(12)

X
= Xe+Xg+XIO+Xll
13

(13)

X
17

-

X12+X13+X14

(14)

Fl

~

X6

(lS)

El

= X10 = XS+X6+ X7

=

~

°1

=

X1 +X +X +X
2 3 4

Xl+X2+X3+X4+XS+X7

Xl3 = XS+X9+XIO+Xll
= XS,+X~+Xl +X'O+X9+X1.\'
o

Xl+X2+X3+X4+XS+X7+Xa+Xg+Xll

(16)
(17)

(18)
(19)

(20)
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Bl

=

AI

XIS * X16

( 23)

Bl + XI7+Xl.S+X19

(24 )

Xl+X2+X3+X4+XS+X7+XS+X9+Xl1X+12X+14X+lS
+X

19

+ (X *X )
1S I6

(25)

Equation (25) is the final Boolean equation for the top event
Al in terms of the input events.
In order to evaluate Equation (25'

~ umerically

in terms of

probability, it is necessary to have probabi lity values for each of
the input events.

Therefore to proceed with the illustration, a set

of assumed values for these events is given in Table 4.

Hypothetical

values are used because real values are not available in the
railroad industry, and if they were the railroads probably y,1Quld not

publish them.

Now the probability of the top event can be computed

by using Equation (25) and inserting numerical values for the
probabilities of the basic input events.

Al = 6.1 x 10

Thus

-5

This value represents the probability of occurrence of the
top event (derailment) based on the assumed values for the input
events.
After the probability of occurrence of the top event is
determined , it may be desirable to seek ways for reducing this
pocobability by changing some of the input events.

To

do this most

effectively, it is necessary to identify those input events that
have the greatest influence on the top event.
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TABLE 4
PROBABILITIES FOR INPUT
EVENTS OF FAULT TREE
IN FIGURE 12*

EVENT
Xl
X
2
X3
X
4
X5
X
7

PROBABILITY *

EVENT

5
.40 X 10-

Xll

5
.50 X 10-

X
12

5
.30 X 10-

X
14

5
.60 X 10-

X
15

5
.20 X 10-

X
16

5
.10 X 10-

Xs

5
.50 X 10-

Xg

5
.60 X 10-

X
1S
X
19

PROBABILITY"

5
. so X 105
.20 X 105
.20 X 104
2.00 X 101
.40 X 105
.60 X 105
.30 X 10-

""'la).:ue.s axe ass\neo. 'tOl: purposes o'i "l.).).usna'tl.on on).y

and have no other significance.

criticality is a measure of the relative seriousness of the
effects of each basic fault, and thus provides a basis for ranking
the faults for corrective action priori ties . . A cri ticali ty number

for a given basic input event combines the impact this event would
have, if it occurred, on the top event , with the likelihood of
occurrence of the basic event.

The computation of a criticality

number therefore involves two steps (11):
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~.

Assign a value of 1.0 to the probability
of a given basic event, while maintaining
the probabilities of all other basic events
at their real values, and compute the
probability of the top event.

2.

Multiply the result of step 1 by the actual

probability of the given basic event.
The first step yi e lds the probability of occurrence of the
top event assuming that the given basic event has already occurred.
This result is then modified by the actual likelihood of occurrence
of the given basic event.
Criticality numbers are computed in this manner for all basic
input events, one at a time, and then the basic events can he
ranked according to their criticality as candidates for corrective
action.

The manual computation of criticality values can be done by
tabular methods.

Examples of such computations are given in Table 5

for the same example used previously for illustrating the
quantitative evaluation of the fault tree in Figure 12.
In order to calculate the probability of occurrence of the
top event , it was previously necessary t o derive the algebraic
expression for this event, and to compute numbers for each term in
the algebraic expression using actual probabilities for the basic
input events.

To compute the criticality of each basic event, only

TIIBIZ 5
COMPUTATION OF CRITICALITY NUMBER'! FOR BASIC
IN THE FAULT TREE CJf' FIGURE 12

Event

Probility Value of TermWhere Event
of
Eve'nt
Occurs

Xl

.40Xl0- 5
5

X
2

.50Xl0-

X3

• 30Xl0-

X
4

• 60XI0-

X5

: 20 XI0-

X
7

.10XI0 -5

X8

• 50XI0-

X9

• 60XI0-

X
11
X
12
X
14

5
5
5

5
5

.00 XlO- 5
.·20xI0

-5

.20XIO- 5

Valuc of Term if
Event Probabil1t:!"'l,O

EVE~"I'S

Probability of Top Event
h~en Event Probability 1.0

•
Criticality
Value

5

1.0

10Xl0- 1

4Xl0- 6

5

1.0

lOXIO- 1

5XlO- 6

1.0

10XI0- 1

3Xl0- 6

1.0

10 XI0- 1

6XI0 -6

1.0

10Xl0- 1

2XI0- 6

1.0

10XlO- 1

lXl0- 6

1.0

lOXI0- 1

5:<10- 6

1.0

10Xl0- 1

SXID -6

1.0

10XIO- 1

OX10- 6

1.0

10XI0-

1

2Xl0- 6

5.JXIO- S

1.0

10XIO- 1

2XIO -6

5.3XlO5.3Xl05.3XI0
5.3XI0

-5
-5

5.3XI0 5
5.3XI0

-5
S

5.3XIO-

5

5.3Xl05.3Xl0-

5.3XIO-

5

5

X
15

2.oxl0

-4

.SXIO- S

.40Xl0- 1

4.0Xl0- 2

8XlO -6

X
16

.4 0 XIO- 1

.OXlO- S

4

-4

lX10- 5

.60XIO- S

5.3Xl0-

,JaXIO -5

5 . 3XI0-

X
18
\9

"In Equation 2S

5
5

2.0Xl0-

2.5xI0

1.0

10Xl0- 1

6Xl0- 6

1.0

10XI0-1

3XI0 -6

~

ID
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the following steps are necessary:
1.

Recalculate the value of the algebraic term

in which the basic event occurs, assuming
that its new value is 1 . 0.

If the event

probability appears in a term which is a sum,

the value of the sum term is autoll1atically 1 . 0
(and no more than 1.0).

If it appears in a

product, the value of the term is the same as

if the given event is removed from the product .
2.

Recalculate the probability of the top event
u sing the result of step 1 (above) for the
value of the term in which the given basic

event appears.
3.

Hultiply the result of step 2 (above) by the

given probability of the basic event .
The number resulting from the last calculation is a measure

of the criticality of the basic event.

Those basic events having

the highest criticality numbers are the first to be considered for

corrective action .

.,
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c.

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis is a relatively simple

and direct approach for identifying basic sources of failure and
their consequences.

The method was developed by reliabi l ity

engineers to determine problems that could arise from malfunctions
of hardware.

The method is not rigi t and can be used for wide l y

differing applications.

The primary purpcse of the analysis is to

identify and remove failures that can cause hazards .

However , as a

side benefit, the analysis also leads to the identification of
. failures that are in themselves not hazardous but might affect the
reliability of the functioning of a system .

The results of such an

analysis also may serve as an input to a Fault Tree .
A Fail ure Modes and Effects

l~alysis

is carried out by fi l ling

in a table havi ng column headings such as those shown in Figure 13.
Several different formats are shown in this figure to indicate that
the metilod is not rigid and that an analyst may choose his own fonnat
o n the basis of his experience and needs to make the analysis most
useful for the specific application .
Figure 13 a r e self- explanatory .

The column headings shown in

This type of analysis is generally

qualitative only , but not necessarily so .

Col umns with headings such

as Failure Frequency , Probability of Occurrence , Failure Rate , or
Mean-Tirne-Between- Failures , may include either re l ative terms or
numeric values for specific items if such values are available.
'l'he level of detail to which the analysis is carried is a
problem that must be resolved by the analyst depending on the purpose

COOPONENT

- FAILURE MODE

DIRECT
EFFECT

EFFECT ON
SYSTEM

Hl\Zl\RD
CATEGORY

RECOMMENDED
CHANGE

•

COMPONENT

ITEM

..........

OPERATING
MODE

FAILURE
MECHANISM

FAILURE
HODE

FAILURE

RATE

-

HAZARDOUS
ASPECT

POSSIBLE
HAZARD

FAILURE
FREQUENCY

HAZARD
DURATION

HAZARD
CATEGORY

SOURCE
OF DATA

-

REMJ\RKS

CORRECTIVE
ACTION

-~-

Fig ~ 13.

Sample Fo rmats f or Fa ilure - Mode s-And-Ef!ects Analysis
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of the analysis.

For example , if the system being analyzed is a

coupling unit for a tanker car , a complete chasis may be considered
as a single element in the system, especially if a numerical value
is available for the reliability of such a chasis .

The analyst would

consider all possible modes of failure of the chasis as a whole,
and would examine the possible consequences of a failure.

At the

other extreme, each individual component of that coupling unit might
be considered as a separate element of the system.

For an extensive system consisting of a number of subsystems,
it may be advisable to divide the system into portions that can be

handled conveniently .

If the probability or likelihood of occurrence

of a failure is of primary interest , the component level to whicr. the
analysis is carried out would depend on the level for which reliability
data are available.

Thus if reliability data are available for an

assembly, there would be no need to analyze the failure modes of each
component within the assembly.
To carry out a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, the analyst

must have a thorough understanding of all components of the system and
of their functions.

This understanding may be obtained from drawings,

written descriptions, or in the case of sma ll hardware assemblies,
by the actual disassembly of the unit into all its components.

The

elements of the system being analyzed should be listed in a logical
sequence so none are omitted.
For each component listed, the analyst must identify and list
all conceivable modes of failure or abnormal functioning.

He must
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then postulate that each such failure or malfunction has indeed
occurred and then examine all possible tmmediate consequences, and
the overall effect on the system.
considered.

Partial failures are not

It should be noted that a given component may have

more than one mode of failure, and each mode of failure may have
more than one effect or consequence.

Thus each failure should be

considered individually and all consequences of the given failure
should be analyzed.

The analyst must also attempt to determine

how a given failure can be prevented, how critical is each
consequence if the failure occurs, and how can criticality of the
consequence be reduced.
Generally, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis is first
accomplished on a qualitative basis.

Quantitative data may then be

applied to establish a reliability or failure level for the system
or subsystem.

Usually four failure modes are considered (12):

1.

Premature operation of a component

2.

Failure of a component to operate at a
prescribed time

3.

Failure of a component to cease· operation
at a prescribed time

4.

Failure of a component during operation

In its original usages, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
detennined where improvenen ts in component life or design were
necessary; and because failure intervals and probabilities were
estimated, maintenance periods and requirements could be established.
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It has proven effective for both purposes.

Deficiencies can be

eliminated or minimized through design changes , redundancies,
incorporation of fail - safe features,

~~d

closer control of critical

characteristics during manufacture and use.
While simple and direct, this method also has certain
limitations.

The most serious is the fact that in dealing with

specific failures of individual components, it does not reveal
possible failure of the system that may be caused by a combination
of events, none of \olhich would be considered hazardous when taken

by itself.

Similarly, since the method is primarily hardware

oriented, it is also unlikely to reveal a system failure that may
cane about from the combined effect of a component fault., which in

i tself is not hazardous , but which would create a serious hazard in
combination with an abnormal environmental condition , or in
combination with a human error .

Figure 14 shows a schematic drawing,

and list of components of an end-of- car cushioning unit for which
an example of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis , is given in
Table 6 (1 3).

The analyses are self- explanatory .

that the blank columns with headings only are

sho~~

It should be noted
in this example

to jndicate that the format is quite arbitrary and can be arranged
as desired by the individual analyst.

.'

06

7

,

Description _______

Component No .
1

Coupler knuckle pin

2

Coupler knuckle

3

Type E coupler head

4

Draft k.ey

5

End sill

6

Hydraulic piston

7

Center si ll

8

Back stop plate

9

Rear lug casting

10

Striker

11

Omplcr key

12

OJ.s hioning unit

13

Restoring

14

Inspection plate

15

Rear crOGS k/'J:y

Fig. 14.

End-of~Car

castil~g

mcch.)ni~m

Cushioning unit

•
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D.

Probabilistic Cost Analysis
To

aid the industry in an attempt to address safety costs,

consider the probabilistic behavior of accident systems .

It will be

useful to classify accident systems into two types, simple and
canplex (14).

A simple system can be described by a single event rate

occurring over elements of time.

This rate may be depressed by the

expenditure of prevention resources.
A complex system may be described as the interaction of two
or more events in the accident causation chain.
It can be shown that if we know the rate of occurrence of an
a ccident event in a given unit of time, t , the probability of no

accidents in units of that time , t , may be computed as follows:
P(o)

where

~~ e prob~)ility

= e

- At

A

=

t

= number of units of base time, t

event rate

of at least one accident can be computed as follows:

P(at l east 1)

=1

- P (o)

Noting that in rare events, which most simple accident systems are,
the probability of at least 1 will compromise the majority of the
probability space , the expected cost of an accident can be computed
from d1e mean cost of the particular accident event being examined.
E(cost)

=

p el) x cost

The cost used in this computation will be the sum of the direct and
indirect accident event costs .
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An example will illustrate this method.

Assume that we are

concerned with a train derailment resulting in the loss of several
freight cars.

This occurs once in 10

6

train hours.

The accident

rate is 1 x 10- 6 •
Assuming that within a given companyls commercial operations
there arc 400,000 train hours a year, the probability of at least

one train accident in one year is:
Plat least 1) = 1
~

1 - c

~

1 - c

~

The

prob~bility

P(l)

P (0)
_(10- 6 )4 x 10 5
-.4

.3297

of exactly one is:
=

Ate-At
11

~

.26B1

The probabili ty of exactly two is:
P(2)

=

(At ) 2

e

-At

21
~

.0536

If it is found that the average accident cost" associated with an

accident of this type is $100,000 then the annual expected cost can
be computed as follows:

90

Expected cost = Event probability x Event cost
E (c)l

= $26 , 810 - - --- - -

E (c ) 2

= $10,720

------- Expected

E (c) 3

=$

2 , 144

-------

Expected cost of three accidents

$39 , 674

-------

TOtal Expected Cost
(neglecting the cost of more
than three accidents)

Expected cost of one accident
cost of two accidents

The expected annual cost of this type of accident may be
considered the value of the accident.

This is a piece of hard

information which will be of significant assistance in reaching a
decision as to how much to effectively invest to reduce this type
of accident.
The complex accident usually results in much higher costs
per accident with low-er probabilities.

If we examine the ITOre costly

of the multiple event activities, the output of the probabilis.tic

examination of the events is a probability density function P(x).
The cost of such an accident may also be described by a function
C(x).

The expected cost of such an accident system may be

determined:
E (cost)

00

=

J_00 P(x)C(x)

dx

The expected value as defined above exists only if the integral is
convergent.

In addition, the determination of the functions P(x)

and C{x) may be difficult in many cases.

HoW\:!ver, some very simple

methods may be used to give a very good approximation of the expected
cost.
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Assume that we have a diesel engine with three brake control

systems.

If we lose all three systems, engine control will be lost

and a catastrophic accident will result .

A brief consideration of

the costs of accidents described previously may place the mean cost
of such an accident at $20,000,000.

By component analysis and laboratory test, the mean time
between failures (MTBF) of the three brake control systems is
determined to be the following:
3

system A

10

System B

3.1 x 10

System C

5.4 x 10

hours
3
2

hours
hours

Assume eight hour trips and all three systems operative at the

beginning of each trip, 1,000 eight hour trips per engine of this
type each year, the expected cost may be computed as follows:
3
-8/10
P(l)A = 1 - e
= .008
3
-8/3.1 x 10
= .0026
=
1
e
P (1) B
2
e- 8 / 5 . 4 x 10
=
= .015
1
P (1) C

P(l)ABC = 3.12 x 10P(l)

1 yr. =

1 -

7

(l-P(I)

ABC

)1000_ 3.12 x 10-4

The probability of an accident of this type occurring in one year is
difficult to evaluate as to criticality.

However, when the expected

cost is computed, the annual value of this type of accident is given
necessary visibility
4
6
E(cost) = 3.12 x 10- (20 x 10 ) = $6,240
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The assumption that pel) is the probability of exactly one accident,
rather than at least one, and that only one may occur ",,'ill result in

an expected cost somewhat lower than the true value.

However , fo r

small accident rates the loss in accuracy is small.

The lower bound

on the expected cost can serve as an action signal.

If the value is

large enough to signal corrective action , the true value must also be
reduced .

It is emphasized again that the annual value of

a~cident

a piece of hard information which will assist in the evaluation of
the entire safety program.
Discounting Safety Costs
Recalling from the total cost curve of Figure 15, we invest

in safety at one point in time and receive our r e turns from this
investment at a later point in time, much as in a normal business
investment.

We must consider the time value of money in our

evaluation of a safety program.
Figure 16 describes ideal results of a normal business
investment.
t

2

It can be seen that a rate of investment over time

- t 1 , amounting to Capital A will result in return of Capital B

over the time t y

-

t3 "

This will be a good investment if the

discounted value of B is equal or greater than A at an interest
rate equal to the cost of capital to the organization.

is
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Fig_ 16.
Ideal Results
of A Normal Business Investment
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In the case of safety cos ts, there is no positive return in

a business sense.
costs.

There is however, a reduction in fubure accident

Therefore, a prevention investment is made today to reduce

future costs to the c;ompany.

It is the net present value or the

discounted value of all of these costs which

mus~

be minimized if we

are to operate with our system at the minimum cost point on a total

safety resource curve.
There are three conditions

~nich

we may consider in an effort

to simplify the many variations which will present themselves when
attempting to perform such an evaluation.
case I:

If little is known of the system or its future ppzformance,
expected costs of accidents cannot be predicted nor can they be

related to prevention costs.

In this case, simple bookkeeping may

be helpful in locating the system on the safety resource curve of

Figure 15.

At the conclusion of each fiscal year, prevention and

accident costs ....'ould be totaled.

If the system is new, as it must be,

an increasing prevention effort is indicated.
costs should be down.

The trend of total

There may be years in which the costs go up

due to the lag between prevention programs and accident reduction.
A persistent upward trend in total safety costs would indicate that
perhaps the prevention program is too large.

This cannot be the

case if the prevention program is a small fraction of the accident
costs .

Inflation can be a problem here and must be removed from the
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computations in this metnod of analysis.

This technique is

analogous to the federal and state methods of financial accounting
in which the books are closed at the end of the fiscal year with no
effort to account for the return to society from the resources
invested during the current year.

Figure 17 depicts this method

of safety value analysis .

TOTAL COST OF SYSTEM SAFETY

ACCI ENT

OS

P

o

.VENT ON

Time (in years)

T

n

Fig_ 17 . Federal and
State Methods of Financial Accounting
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case 2:
Frequently specific safety projects can be identified.

These

projects require a large investment of resources at a point in time.
It is hoped that future reduction in accident costs will in some way
canpensate for this invesbnent.

An attractive attribute of using dollars to measure the value
of a safety project is that from the point of view of society, their
value remains linear relative to total worth.

It is, therefore,

possihle to separate specific projects from the total system safety
analysis.
Figure 18 illustrates this method of analysis.

It can be

seen that if the discounted value of the future accident cost

attributable to the project is equal to or greater than the initial

investment cost of the project, the project is justifiable in that
it will result in reduced total safety cost attributable to this
system.

'.
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Case 3 :

The third and more genera l case of system sa f ety value
ana l ysis is the condition of contin uous expenditure to the p l anning
hori zon for accident preventi on.

This expend i ture should be

accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the expected cost of
accidents.

The discounted value of the cost reduction must be

greater than the discounted v alue of the prevention costs.

19 depicts this method of safety value analysis.
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The safety department continually finds itself in competition for

company resources in the process of implementation of their safety
programs.

Traditionally the method of "selling" their program is

to invoke the spector of a catastrophe or to insist that the system
requires a greater degree of safety.

In this situation, competing

against we ll documented and quantifiable dl::mands for r esource
application to other elements of the system, the safety department
is at a distinct disadvantage.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the railroad
industry has a history of pursuing and solving safety problems.
The extreme magnitude and complexity of the total American railroad
system, makes identification and control of all potential hazards
an extremely involved task.

While it is not possible to examine

the American railroad system in the concept stage, it is however ,
now possible to analyze incremental changes in subsystems for their
potential impact on the entire system .

Implementation of appropriate

changes within the existing system can and will result in control
and elimination of hazards in the railroad industry .
A comprehensive system safety program is defined as the
selection and implementation of the mechanisms necessary for
achieving and maintaining an optimum level of safety in the operations
of the railroad industry.

It encompasses the total definition of

policy, organization, operational control, evaluation, and
corrective action - considering the railroad capability of the
nation as a system and safety as a principal objective of that
system.
By utilizing the systematic approach to safety, railroad
accidents can be predicted and analyzed before they occur.

They

can then be prevented by taking the action necessary to eliminate
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or control the hazards which lead to accidents.
analysis methods will identify possible hazards.
be assumed unknowingly.

System safety
Risks will not

Those risks which are assumed will be those

that have been identified , and in which a management decision has
been made to accept them.

This approach avoids crises by foreseeing

them.

The benefits to be derived from the system safety approach go
far beyond the prevention of an accident.
for system safety are well spent.

The resources allocated

In addition to the large sums

needed to settle accident claims, make repairs to the system and
restore the environment, consideration must be given to the value
of the operating company's reputation, image, and future business
potential.

One accident that could have been avoided can cost many

times the price of an effective analysis effort.
A number of the accidents investigated by the Federal Railroad
Administration revealed the existence of hazards that were activated
into accidents .

System safety analysis would have made these hazards

known and given management a chance to correct them before the
accident occurred.
The system safety organization may be defined as the group of
people responsible for establishing, managing and performing the
overall system safety

progra~.

This definition places no constraints

upon the size or the character of the safety organization .

Further-

more, the de finition is equally applicable to system safety
organizations that may be identified as a single entity and to those
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that are widely diffused and cannot be represented on a conventional
organization chart as a single entity.

Although one cannot prescribe

a unique system safety organization on a prior basis, the functions
and responsibilities of all persons associated with establishing
policy or implementing any aspects of the safety program should be
clearly established.
The System Safety Programs presented in the hypothetical model
is one approach to utilizing the principles of System Safety as
developed and used in the Aerospace Industry.

It is believed to be

an effective approach in that it addresses the basic goal of accident
prevention through the judicious application of hazard identification
techniques such as fault trees, evaluates the hazards using
qualitative decision tree logic, and assures the implementation of
elimination or control measures consistent with the hazard precedence
sequence expounded as an integral part of system safety.

On the

other hand, it is designed to take full advantage of rail industry
experience accumulated by owners, builders, and the using public.
It is obvious that r ail transit hazards having the potential
for catastrophic results are collision and derailment which can
r esult from failures of critical car systems , wayside equipment ,
the running rajl, operating personnel or any combination .

Therefore,

the prevention of oollisions or derailments will best be achieved
from the car standpoint by enhancing the failsafety of contributing
systems.

At the same tillIe, continued application of "lessons

learned" from accidents which have happened must be made.

The
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hazard associated with mixing different types of car construction
and brake systems in the same service is an example of one such
lesson learned .

Hazards resulting individually in much less severe consequences
also must be give n continued attention since greater frequencies of
occurrence can easily reach a high cumulative severity.

To this

end the interfaces between the car and its environment including the
using public must be evaluated in the interests of safety enhancement.
If the foregoing safety actions are applie d, using the
application of System Safety principles described or ones similar to
them, rail trans it will continue to be a leader as a safe mode of
transportaticn and \>"i11 eOJen imprcve as rail tra:1sit expands.

The objective of this thesis was to explore and consider such
system safety programs and techniques that would ehhance the accident
and fatality problem in the rail industry.

It is recognized that

these initial efforts only serve to open the door and that much more
comprehensive research is needed.
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